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Abstract
The structures of protein and DNA were discovered primarily by means of synthe-
sizing component-level information about bond types, lengths, and angles, rather 
than analyzing X-ray diffraction photographs of these molecules. In this paper, I 
consider the synthetic and analytic approaches to exemplify alternative heuristics for 
approaching mid-twentieth-century macromolecular structure determination. I argue 
that the former was, all else being equal, likeliest to generate the correct structure 
in the shortest period of time. I begin by characterizing problem solving in these 
cases as proceeding via the elimination of candidate structures through the succes-
sive application of component-level information and interpretations of X-ray diffrac-
tion photographs, each of which serves as a kind of constraint on structure. Then, I 
argue that although each kind of constraint enables the elimination of a considerable 
proportion of candidate structures, component-level constraints are significantly 
more likely to do so correctly. Thus, considering them before X-ray diffraction pho-
tographs is a better heuristic than one that reverses this order. Because the synthetic 
approach that resulted in the determination of the protein and DNA structures exem-
plifies such a heuristic, its use can help account for these discoveries.
Keywords Heuristics · X-ray diffraction crystallography · Evidence · Protein 
structure · DNA structure · Alpha helix · Information · Discovery
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Introduction
Within a few years in the mid-twentieth century, Linus Pauling1 determined the 
structure of protein and Watson and Crick discovered the structure of DNA. In 
both cases, the eventual discoverers of these structures competed with rival groups 
in other labs. And in both cases, the discoverers and their rivals approached the 
problem differently. Pauling, together with collaborator Robert Corey, adopted a 
bottom-up, compositional approach2: he took what he knew about different struc-
tural components of protein—bond types,3 lengths, and angles between atoms in 
the polypeptide chain—and used these as puzzle pieces, so to speak, from which 
the three-dimensional structure could be built up (Judson 1996, p. 62). Inspired by 
Pauling’s success, Watson and Crick adopted a similar strategy, constructing three-
dimensional models from structural features of DNA. Their rivals, Sir Lawrence 
Bragg, John Kendrew, and Max Perutz in the case of protein and Rosalind Franklin 
in the case of DNA,4 instead adopted a top-down, decompositional approach: rather 
than attempting to synthesize information about what was known about the individ-
ual components of the molecules, these groups instead analyzed X-ray diffraction 
photographs of the molecules in question.
One might ask, to what extent was this difference in approach responsible for 
the eventual successes of the discoverers in each case? Although I will propose an 
answer to this question, this will be only my secondary aim. My primary aim will be 
to address a related set of issues. Suppose a beginning graduate student wishing to 
work on the structure of one of these macromolecules were selecting between labs 
to join. Which should she choose? Or suppose a granting agency were attempting 
to determine which research project to fund. Which is most promising? The driving 
question: given the state of scientific knowledge and technology at the time, which 
of these approaches—the synthetic one championed by Pauling and Watson and 
Crick, or the analytic one favoured by Bragg’s group and Franklin—had the great-
est likelihood of finding the molecular structure in question in the shortest period of 
time?
This is a question about heuristics, problem-solving guidelines or “rules of 
thumb.” There is no algorithm for solving complex scientific problems like those of 
protein and DNA structure. Scientists do not have a set of instructions that, if pre-
cisely followed, will lead them to the correct structure. Rather, a degree of trial and 
2 ‘Bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ are here used in the information processing sense: as will become clear, I 
am not drawing on the distinction between theory and data, but between building up a whole from com-
ponent parts and breaking it down.
3 In this case, whether they were single or double bonds.
4 Pauling also worked on the structure of DNA, but only intermittently. He was more focused on other 
projects, and the three-stranded model he eventually came up with was a rather hurried effort. We will 
not consider it here.
1 More precisely, Pauling discovered one way in which a chain of amino acids can fold in three dimen-
sions, what we refer to as the secondary structure of protein. The nature of the problem of protein struc-
ture that Pauling solved is discussed in “The transformed problem: reducing the space of structural pos-
sibilities by applying constraints on structure” section.
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error is involved. Scientists follow promising leads and make false starts; they pro-
pose and abandon various hypotheses. The process is messy, yet not directionless: it 
is guided by some overarching principles, even if scientists deviate from them from 
time to time. So to say, for instance, that one has followed the heuristic of the syn-
thetic approach, one need not have considered all component-level considerations 
before looking at X-ray diffraction photographs. Rather, one follows the heuristic so 
long as one in general considers such constraints first. Thus, Pauling can be under-
stood as having followed the heuristic even if, as we will see in “A (concrete) heuris-
tic: average informativeness of constraints on molecular structure” section, he went 
back and forth between reasoning from known structural components of protein and 
X-ray diffraction photographs to some extent.
Wimsatt (2006, pp. 464–65) identifies several important properties of heuristics, 
four of which will be particularly relevant for what follows. First, although heuris-
tics might increase the likelihood of success, they do not guarantee it, in contrast 
to truth-preserving algorithms, which guarantee the truth of the conclusion given 
the truth of the premises. This is in part because heuristics impose far fewer restric-
tions on how one should proceed, and therefore even if one adopts the best possible 
heuristic, other factors can affect whether or not one succeeds. Second, heuristics 
are “cost-effective…in terms of demands on memory, computation, or other limited 
resources” (Wimsatt 2006, p. 465, emphasis original). Third, applying a heuristic to 
a particular problem amounts to transforming that problem into a non-equivalent, 
but related problem. Thus, when a problem is solved using a heuristic, there remains 
the question of whether it is appropriate to consider the solution to the transformed 
problem to also be a solution to the original problem. Finally, heuristics are purpose-
relative; that is, they are useful for certain aims, but not others.
Which heuristic was best for approaching the problem of determining the struc-
ture of a complex macromolecule such as protein or DNA in the mid-twentieth cen-
tury? In particular, which was likeliest to be the most “cost-effective” in the sense 
of the second property above? In order to answer these questions, let us begin by 
characterizing different pieces of empirical evidence and theoretical considerations 
as constraints on molecular structure: in order to be considered acceptable, a struc-
ture must accord with or account for each such piece of evidence and theory. We 
may then characterize the synthetic and analytic approaches as differing with respect 
to the order in which different constraints on structure are taken into account. The 
synthetic approach can be understood as beginning by taking into account infor-
mation about bond types, lengths, and angles, considering X-ray diffraction photo-
graphs of the molecule in question only afterwards, while the analytic approach can 
be regarded as reversing this order, deriving what can be known from such X-ray 
diffraction photographs first, and then comparing that with information about bond 
types, lengths, and angles.
The order in which different considerations, particularly pieces of empirical evi-
dence, are considered is not usually taken to have any bearing on the outcome of an 
investigation. Indeed, Bayesians assume that an adequate model of updating beliefs 
ought to be commutative, i.e. updating on evidence A before evidence B should pro-
duce the same degree of confirmation as updating on B before A, and a common 
criticism of Jeffrey Conditionalization is that it fails to meet this requirement (cf. 
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Domotor 1980; Doring 1999; Field 1978; Skyrms 1986; van Fraassen 1989). But 
the view that the order in which evidence is consulted should not affect the outcome 
of an investigation rests on the assumption that the time available for its completion 
is infinite. In practice, of course, this is not the case.5 Research is often driven by 
competition between groups, and in order to make a discovery at all, one must make 
it first, beating one’s rival to it. In actual scientific practice, speed and efficiency 
matter.
I will argue that the order in which different constraints are taken into account 
affects how quickly or efficiently a problem is likely to be solved, thereby contribut-
ing to the “cost-effectiveness” of a heuristic. My goal is to demonstrate not only that 
this order matters, but also to explain why it does. In order to do so, we may under-
stand the problem of molecular structure determination as beginning with a space 
of candidate structures, each a possible solution to the problem, the size of which 
is reduced through the consideration of various constraints, thereby transforming 
the original problem into a related problem, in accordance with the third property 
of heuristics above.6 The consideration of a particular constraint requires its appli-
cation to the problem, which can involve interpretation: what does it tell us about 
which solutions are possible? As we will see, such an understanding of the problem 
enables us to estimate what I will call the average informativeness of a constraint, a 
function of two variables: (1) the extent to which its application reduces the size of 
the possibility space, leaving fewer structures for further consideration, and (2) how 
confident scientists could be that they had correctly applied the constraint, that is, 
eliminated only incorrect structures through its application.
Developing an understanding of how to select between heuristics is significant for 
two reasons. First, scientists often make decisions about how to approach complex 
problems in the face of various kinds of uncertainties: about the truth, accuracy, or 
instrumental value of relevant theories and models, about the feasibility and applicabil-
ity of experimental procedures, and about the reliability of instruments and interpreta-
tion of results, not to mention other social and pragmatic factors. These decisions are 
far from straightforward. Thus, an analysis of how to approach them is valuable in its 
own right. However, such an analysis can also shed new light on two well-known his-
torical cases, providing at least a tentative answer to the question of how a difference 
in approach might have contributed to the successes of the discoveries of the protein 
and DNA structures. I will argue that, to the extent that the problems and approaches 
to solving them adopted by the historical actors reflect the transformed problems and 
heuristics that will be the focus of this paper, we ought to accept the answer to the 
question of which heuristic was best as also explaining—perhaps only partially, and 
5 There is a longstanding debate about how much evidence scientists should collect, given a finite 
amount of time for an investigation, and what the relationship is between this and the ideal limit of what 
they should do given an infinite amount of time. See Heesen (2015) for a review of the literature and 
original proposal. The question I address in this paper is different. I assume the availability of a common 
set of constraints on structure and ask how the order in which different kinds of constraints from that set 
are consulted affects how quickly the investigation can be concluded.
6 In a similar vein, Craver (2007, Ch. 7) characterizes the process of determining mechanistic explana-
tions in neuroscience as eliminating possible explanations.
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in conjunction with other proposals—the successes of the groups that made the dis-
coveries. And I will further argue that there is, indeed, significant overlap between the 
idealized problems and heuristics I describe here and the approaches adopted by the 
different groups in these cases.
The paper proceeds as follows. I begin by introducing the problems of protein and 
DNA structure as they stood in the mid-twentieth century, describing the ways in which 
different theoretical and empirical considerations constrained which structures were 
permissible. I show that the process of structure determination may be understood as 
proceeding via the successive elimination of candidate structures, with each constraint 
dictating which structures are to be eliminated (“The transformed problem: reducing 
the space of structural possibilities by applying constraints on structure” section). Then, 
I introduce the notion of average informativeness. I argue that the best heuristic is the 
one that considers the most informative constraint first (“An (abstract) heuristic: weigh-
ing confidence in correct constraint application against degree of possibility space 
reduction” section). I show that, in our case studies, component-level constraints con-
cerning bond types, distances, and angles were more informative than whole-molecule 
X-ray diffraction photographs, so taking the former into account before the latter was 
most likely to yield the correct structure first (“A (concrete) heuristic: average informa-
tiveness of constraints on molecular structure” section). I discuss the extent to which 
the transformed problem of molecular structure determination reflects the actual prob-
lem (“Does the transformed problem reflect the real problem?” section), and conclude 
by suggesting that Pauling’s and Watson and Crick’s having followed this heuristic 
can help account for their discoveries of the protein and DNA structures respectively 
(“Denouement: explaining Pauling’s and Watson and Crick’s successes” section).
The transformed problem: reducing the space of structural 
possibilities by applying constraints on structure
The mid-twentieth-century problems of protein and DNA structure were to deter-
mine how one or more chains of molecular subunits folded in three dimensions. In 
the case of protein, the subunits in question were amino acids, each with the same 
basic structure but differentiated from one another by unique R groups. Strings of 
amino acids were known to be connected by peptide bonds into polypeptide chains 
(Fig. 1). In the case of DNA, the subunits were nucleotides, each made up of a phos-
phate group, the sugar deoxyribose, and one of four bases: adenine, guanine, cyto-
sine, or thymine. The sugar–phosphate chains they formed had directionality in the 
sense that they had two distinct ends, known as the 3′ and 5′ ends (Fig. 2). The prob-
lem was to determine how many such chains DNA contained, how they were ori-
ented with respect to one another, and how the molecule folded in three dimensions.
In each case, the problem may be characterized as follows. One begins with a 
space of possible structures, defined by what was known about the molecule. In 
the case of protein, the set of candidate structures was composed of the various 
ways the polypeptide chain might fold—its possible conformations. In the case of 
DNA, this set was larger, consisting of the various possible permutations of two or 
three sugar–phosphate chains, arranged in parallel or anti-parallel, with the bases 
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on the inside or outside of the molecule, and again all of the possible ways in which 
the molecule could fold. The size of this space is initially very large, since bond 
lengths and angles could be varied continuously and variously combined with one 
Fig. 1  The structure of a polypeptide chain, with the R groups corresponding to different amino acids 
and peptide bonds indicated. The problem of protein structure was to determine how polypeptide chains 
folded in three dimensions
Fig. 2  A sugar-phosphate chain 
with 3′ and 5′ ends labeled
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another.7 It may be reduced through the consideration of different constraints on 
structure, bits of information about bond types, lengths, and angles and X-ray dif-
fraction photographs of the molecule.
How such reductions of the possibility space take place depends on the type of 
constraint under consideration. Let us consider each in turn. To see how information 
about bond types, lengths, and angles constrains structure, enabling the successive 
reduction of the size of the possibility space, let us consider a simplified example. 
Suppose that we are trying to determine the structure of formamide, and we know it 
to have the following structural formula:
Suppose that we also know the bond angles and distances between the atoms in 
formamide. We may use these as constraints enabling the successive elimination of 
candidate structures as follows. Prior to the application of a constraint, very many 
structures are possible, since each of the bond lengths and angles in the molecule 
can take on any value. If we apply the information that the C–N bond distance is 
1.34 Å, we may eliminate candidate structures with C–N bond distances other than 
1.34 Å from further consideration.8 If we then consider the fact that the C=O bond 
distance is 1.24 Å, we may again eliminate further structures from the possibility 
space, leaving only those with 1.34 Å C–N and 1.24 Å C=O bond distances. We 
may continue in this fashion, thereby fixing the bond distances in the molecule. 
Similarly, applying bond angles as constraints enables us to eliminate any structures 
that do not conform with them. Finally, bond types also constrain structure in the 
same way.9 A molecule may only rotate about a single bond. Moreover, due to a 
phenomenon known as resonance, some bonds that are depicted in structural for-
mulae as single bonds in fact have partial double-bond character. The peptide bond 
in formamide—the same bond that joins amino acids together to form a polypeptide 
chain—is an instance of such a bond: an electron from the C=O bond spends some 
of its time at the C–N bond. Thus, rotation about the peptide bond is also prohibited. 
Upon taking each component-level constraint into consideration, successively nar-
rowing down the space of possible structures, we are left with only one, the planar 
molecular structure of formamide.
9 Bond type and length are, of course, related. For instance, single bonds are longer than double bonds. I 
separate them here because they provide different sorts of constraints on structure.
7 If bond lengths and angles are allowed to take on any positive real value, the number of possible struc-
tures is infinite. The more we restrict permissible values of these variables—for instance, by setting 
upper and lower bounds on bond lengths and discretizing bond lengths and angles—the fewer the initial 
number of possibilities. And, in practice, the possibilities would be so restricted. In any case, the number 
is very large, and that is all that is necessary for the purposes of the argument in this paper.
8 This example is adapted from Pauling’s Nature of the Chemical Bond (1960, pp. 281–82).
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Let us now turn to the way in which X-ray diffraction photographs of a mole-
cule constrain the space of possible structures. X-ray diffraction photographs are 
produced by shining a beam of X-rays through a regular lattice with repeating sub-
components, such as a crystallized long-chain molecule. The electron clouds of the 
atoms in the molecule scatter X-rays, producing a diffraction pattern on a photo-
graphic plate. The locations and intensities of spots on a photograph form a recipro-
cal lattice, which contains information about the amplitude of the X-rays. However, 
in order to determine atomic positions from these photographs, not only the ampli-
tude but also the phase of the X-rays is required. Thus, the photographs contain only 
partial information about structure. This is known as the phase problem.
Thus, in order to use X-ray diffraction photographs as constraints on structure, 
one had to first interpret them to determine what structural information they pro-
vided. This should be borne in mind in the following illustrations, and will be 
important in the discussion in “A (concrete) heuristic: average informativeness 
of constraints on molecular structure” section. At the University of Leeds, crys-
tallographer William Astbury produced numerous X-ray diffraction photographs 
that would figure crucially in the determination of the protein and DNA struc-
tures. In the 1930s, he showed that there were two forms of keratin, a protein 
that makes up wool, fingernails, and hair: unstretched (which he named ‘alpha’ 
keratin) and stretched (‘beta’) keratin. A characteristic spot in Astbury’s photo-
graphs was taken to indicate that alpha keratin had a subunit that repeated every 
5.1 Å (Fig. 3).10 Taking this spot into consideration constrained protein structure 
in the sense that it enabled one to eliminate any structure lacking such a repeat-
ing subunit from the space of possibilities. Similarly, Astbury’s photo of DNA, 
taken before the war and published in 1947, was taken to show that DNA con-
tained a monotonous repetition of the four nucleotides with 3.4 Å between each, 
that it had a large structural repeat every 27 Å, and that the sugar component was 
Fig. 3  One of Astbury’s X-ray 
diffraction photographs of kera-
tin. Reproduced from Astbury 
and Street (1932)
10 Although Perutz and Kendrew, at Bragg’s lab, also performed diffraction studies of the proteins 
hemoglobin and myoglobin, Astbury’s photographs were most widely influential, since keratin is a much 
simpler molecule and thus yielded clearer diffraction images.
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parallel to the flat bases. Again, this photo would constrain DNA structure by 
eliminating from the space of possibilities structures that did not contain these 
features. Finally, as is well known, Franklin also produced a great number of 
clear diffraction photographs of DNA. Her most significant finding was that DNA 
could take on one of two discrete forms: a crystalline ‘A’ form, or a wet ‘B’ form. 
Franklin discovered that the DNA sample in Astbury’s photo was a mixture of 
the two forms. By the spring of 1952, she had a number of very clear images of 
both the A and B forms (Fig. 5). The distinct ‘X’ pattern in the photo of the B 
form suggested a helical conformation for DNA, enabling the elimination of non-
helical structures from the space of possibilities.   
We have seen how both component-level information about bond types, 
lengths, and angles and whole-molecule X-ray diffraction photographs may con-
strain molecular structure by enabling the successive elimination of candidate 
structures incompatible with them from the possibility space. If one’s aim is to 
determine the correct structure of a molecule as quickly as possible, one ought 
to reduce the size of the possibility space as much as possible with each con-
straint one considers. Thus, if one had full confidence in one’s interpretation of 
each constraint—and hence also in the reduction of the possibility space resulting 
from its consideration—then those constraints that eliminate the greatest number 
of structural candidates, leaving the fewest remaining for further consideration, 
ought to be taken into account first.
But in scientific practice, one may never have full confidence in one’s interpreta-
tion; at best, one may hold a high degree of belief that it is correct. So a cost-effec-
tive heuristic must not only maximize how many structural candidates are elimi-
nated with each constraint; it must also maximize the degree to which scientists can 
be confident they have eliminated only those structures that are incorrect through its 
application. For if the application of a constraint mistakenly eliminates the correct 
structure, removing it from the space of possibilities remaining for further consid-
eration, one will be led astray, and might end up having to backtrack or start the 
process again. This is precisely what happened to Bragg, Kendrew, and Perutz. In a 
paper published in the spring of 1950, they considered twenty candidate structures 
for alpha keratin, and selected from among them the one they thought most likely to 
be correct on the basis that it that best accounted for Astbury’s 5.1-Å spot (Bragg 
et  al. 1950), eliminating a structure that was fairly similar to the alpha helix, the 
correct structure eventually discovered by Pauling (Olby 1974, pp. 289–90). Thus, 
scientists ought to begin by considering those constraints that eliminate the greatest 
number of candidate structures with the greatest certainty.
But things are not always so simple, since those constraints that eliminate the 
greatest number of structural candidates may not be those in which scientists have 
the greatest confidence. It may be the case that a given constraint eliminates many 
possibilities, but scientists are not very certain that it is correct. Alternatively, they 
might be reasonably confident in a particular constraint that eliminates very few 
possibilities. So how ought they determine the order in which to apply different 
constraints?
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An (abstract) heuristic: weighing confidence in correct constraint 
application against degree of possibility space reduction
I will argue that scientists must weigh the number of structural possibilities that 
the application of a given constraint eliminates against how certain they can be that 
it has eliminated only incorrect ones. I will begin by describing the game Twenty 
Questions and discussing the order in which questions ought to be asked in this 
game to maximize one’s chances of winning (“A heuristic for twenty questions” sec-
tion). Then, I will argue that playing Twenty Questions is importantly analogous to 
the process of protein and DNA structure determination, so we can apply some of 
what we know about the former case to the latter (“Twenty questions and molecular 
structure determination” section).
A heuristic for Twenty Questions
In the game Twenty Questions, one player brings to mind some entity or being—let 
us call it the ‘object of inquiry’—and the other tries to guess what it is by asking a 
series of yes-or-no questions. Since the maximum number of questions permitted 
is twenty, the goal is to reveal the identity of the object of inquiry by asking as few 
questions as possible. What is the best question to ask at each stage in Twenty Ques-
tions? Suppose we have reached a stage in the game where we know that the object 
of inquiry is a whole number between 1 and 100. In this case, there are one hundred 
possible answers left. Consider three candidates for the next question:
Q1. Is the number 1?
Q2. Is it greater than 80?
Q3. Is it even?
Asking Q1 carves out the remaining possibilities into groups of one and ninety-nine. 
If the answer is ‘Yes’, we are left with only one possibility and the game is over, 
whereas ‘No’ leaves us with ninety-nine remaining for further consideration. Thus, 
the probability that only one out of one hundred possibilities will be eliminated is 
0.99, whereas the probability that ninety-nine possibilities will be eliminated is 0.01. 
Asking Q2 divides remaining possibilities into groups of twenty (if the answer is 
‘Yes’) and eighty (if the answer is ‘No’); the probabilities that twenty and eighty 
possibilities will be eliminated are 0.8 and 0.2 respectively. Finally, asking Q3 
divides the possibility space in half: fifty possibilities for ‘Yes’, fifty for ‘No’. Thus, 
the probability that fifty possibilities will be eliminated is 1.
The best heuristic for playing Twenty Questions is to ask questions like Q3, those 
that divide the possibility space in half, or as close to half as possible. Although we 
might get lucky in asking Q1 and get the right answer in just one question on some 
particular play of the game, this would happen rarely. At earlier stages in the game, 
getting the right answer by asking questions like Q1 would be even more rare: if we 
had determined only that the object of inquiry was a whole number between one 
and a thousand, we would have a 0.001% chance of guessing its identity in just one 
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question. This probability would be even lower if we only knew that the object of 
inquiry was a whole number, or if we did not know that it was a number at all.
Q3 is a better question than Q2 and especially Q1 because it finds the best bal-
ance between how many possibilities might be eliminated and how certain one 
can be that this many possibilities will in fact be eliminated. That is, on average, 
Q3 eliminates more possibilities than Q2 or Q1. We can be reasonably certain, for 
instance, that the answer to Q1 will be ‘No’ because the probability that the answer 
will be ‘No’ is 0.99. Although we might get lucky if the object of inquiry is 1, on 
average, we do not learn much by asking Q1: usually, we just learn that the number 
is not 1, eliminating only one of one hundred possibilities. So we should ask ques-
tions like Q3 first, asking questions like Q1 and Q2 only in later stages of the game.
Twenty Questions and molecular structure determination
There are several similarities between playing Twenty Questions and determining 
protein or DNA structure. First, the best heuristic for both is whichever one most 
reliably finds the shortest route to success: in Twenty Questions, the one that mini-
mizes the number of questions that must be asked to determine the identity of the 
object of inquiry, and in the process of molecular structure determination, the one 
that minimizes the number of inferential steps required to find the correct struc-
ture. Second, just as different considerations in our case study act as constraints on 
molecular structure, so too do question–answer pairs in Twenty Questions, suggest-
ing possible identities for the object of inquiry while eliminating others. Finally, 
both Twenty Questions and molecular structure determination involve some degree 
of uncertainty at each step: the answer to a question cannot be predicted, and one 
cannot know whether one’s application of a constraint to eliminate particular candi-
date structures is correct.
However, while both Twenty Questions and the process of molecular structure 
determination involve some degree of uncertainty at each step, the nature of this 
uncertainty is different in each case. In Twenty Questions, a player cannot predict 
what the answer to a question will be. As we saw in the last section, her uncertainty 
is precisely quantifiable: the probability of each answer is the proportion of pos-
sibilities remaining in the possibility space that are compatible with that answer. In 
contrast, the uncertainty in the process of molecular structure determination resides 
in scientists’ not knowing whether a given application of a constraint is correct, and 
thus not knowing whether the correct structure does, indeed, lie in the space of pos-
sible structures remaining for further consideration. In Twenty Questions, a player is 
uncertain how much the space of possible structures will be reduced when a ques-
tion is asked; but once she receives the answer, her uncertainty is dissolved, and she 
is left with a new, definite possibility space that helps her decide which question 
to ask next. In the case of molecular structure determination, the uncertainty in a 
scientist’s application of a constraint remains once that application has been made. 
Moreover, it ‘infects’ the remainder of the process in the sense that if the application 
is incorrect, subsequent reasoning about the structure is led astray.
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Although the kind of uncertainty inherent in applications of constraints in the 
case of protein structure determination is different from that which exists upon ask-
ing a question in Twenty Questions, both kinds of uncertainty have the same effect: 
they detract from the efficiency of the process at hand. Thus, in both cases, one has 
an imperative to reduce this uncertainty as much as possible. In fact, this impera-
tive is greater for the process of molecular structure determination, since the kind of 
uncertainty present there has the potential to lead scientists off course, putting them 
at risk of having to backtrack and determine where they went wrong. Such a costly 
error is simply not possible in Twenty Questions. Moreover, the detractions from 
the efficiency of the process that both contributions make are similar in degree. By 
asking questions like “Is the number 1?” at each stage, a player is highly unlikely 
to guess the identity of the object of inquiry in just twenty questions; similarly, by 
applying constraints in a way that is unlikely to be correct, one probably will not 
determine the correct structure of protein or DNA in a timely manner.
Despite this difference in kinds of uncertainty, important features of the analogy 
between Twenty Questions and the process of molecular structure determination are 
preserved: maximizing the number of possibilities eliminated with each step con-
tributes to the efficiency of the process, as does minimizing the amount of uncer-
tainty present at each juncture. We may capture these features using what I will call 
average informativeness, or simply informativeness for short, to determine the order 
in which to consider different constraints.11 The informativeness of constraint is a 
function of (1) the extent to which its application reduces the size of the possibil-
ity space and (2) the extent to which scientists were warranted in believing that the 
application is correct. Although (1) and (2) cannot be precisely quantified, as I will 
show in the next section, their relative values can nonetheless be estimated. So just 
as the best heuristic for Twenty Questions is to ask questions that reduce the space 
of possible answers with the greatest certainty each time, the best heuristic for deter-
mining protein or DNA structure, other things being equal, is to consider the most 
informative constraint at each stage.12
A (concrete) heuristic: average informativeness of constraints 
on molecular structure
In the last section, I introduced an abstract heuristic for determining molecular 
structure: different constraints should be applied in order of decreasing informative-
ness, where informativeness is a function of the extent to which the application of 
a constraint reduces the size of the space of possible structures and how confident 
scientists could be that this application is correct. In this section, I will argue that 
11 Average informativeness is inspired by (but not identical to) the notion of informational entropy, a 
measure for average amount of information, which originated in Claude Shannon’s (1948) mathematical 
theory of communication.
12 Discussion of this ceteris paribus clause follows in “Does the transformed problem reflect the real 
problem?” section. It will henceforth generally be omitted for the sake for brevity.
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component-level constraints were, in this sense, more informative than X-ray dif-
fraction photographs of the molecule in the cases of protein and DNA structure 
determination: although both kinds of constraints enabled the elimination of a con-
siderable proportion of the possibility space, the confidence that scientists were war-
ranted in having in their applications of component-level constraints significantly 
outweighed the confidence they were warranted in having in their interpretations 
of X-ray diffraction photographs. Thus, the best (concrete) heuristic for molecular 
structure determination in these cases was to apply component-level constraints to 
eliminate possible structures first, only afterwards eliminating further structures 
using interpretations of X-ray diffraction photographs.
Let us consider each of the factors that contribute to the informativeness of 
a constraint in turn, beginning with the extent to which its application enables a 
reduction of the size of the possibility space. To approximate the extent to which 
the application of a component-level constraint reduces the size of the possibility 
space, consider again the example of determining the structure of formamide (“The 
transformed problem: reducing the space of structural possibilities by applying 
constraints on structure” section). Applying the constraint of the 1.34-Å C–N bond 
distance eliminated fewer than, say, a tenth of the possibilities. For even once we 
fix the C–N bond distance, our possibility space still includes structural candidates 
with any bond angles and distances for all of the other bonds in the molecule. On 
the other hand, Astbury’s interpretation of his X-ray diffraction photograph of alpha 
keratin certainly eliminated more than half, possibly more than three-quarters, of 
remaining possibilities: it reduced the possibility space from including any configu-
ration to only those with a repeating subunit every 5.1 Å.
The proportions of eliminated structures I have here indicated are meant only as 
first-pass, rough-and-ready estimates. My aim is merely to show that although the 
interpretation of an X-ray diffraction photograph eliminates a greater proportion of 
the remaining structures than the application of a component-level constraint, the 
latter is nonetheless able to eliminate a significant number of structural possibili-
ties. This is important. If the number of structures eliminated by the application of 
a component-level constraint were sufficiently small, it would not matter how confi-
dent scientists were in this application; it would be better to begin instead by exam-
ining those constraints in which they had less confidence but which permitted the 
elimination of a greater number of structural candidates. But the disparity between 
the number of structures eliminated by the application of component-level con-
straints and by interpretation of X-ray diffraction photographs is not quite so great: 
component-level constraints and X-ray diffraction photographs both reduce the size 
of the space of structural candidates remaining for further consideration to a signifi-
cant degree.
Let us turn now to the second factor contributing to a constraint’s informa-
tiveness. How confident could scientists be in their applications of each kind of 
constraint? That is, how certain could they be that, upon the elimination of pos-
sibilities through the application of a particular constraint, the correct structure 
remained in the set of structural candidates remaining for further consideration? 
The certainty that one is warranted in having in the application of a constraint is 
a product of at least two considerations: (1) the number of competing possibility 
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space reductions compatible with that constraint and (2) the reliability of the con-
straint itself. If there are several ways to reduce the possibility space by applying 
a particular constraint, there exists the possibility that one chooses among them 
incorrectly, mistakenly removing the correct structure from further consideration. 
Similarly, if the constraint itself is unreliable, one may also be led astray by elim-
inating structural possibilities on its basis. I will show that, in our case studies, 
component-level constraints fared far better than X-ray diffraction photographs on 
both these fronts.
Each component-level constraint can generally only be applied in one correct 
way. Consider again the example of determining the structure of formamide by 
applying different such constraints in succession. Applying the 1.34-Å C–N bond 
distance to constrain structural possibilities amounts to eliminating any structure 
that does not have a 1.34-Å C–N bond distance; there is no other way to apply 
this constraint correctly. Similarly, the partial double-bond character of the C–N 
bond necessitated the elimination of any structure permitting rotation about this 
bond. In contrast, every X-ray diffraction photograph is compatible with multiple 
interpretations due to limitations intrinsic to the technology of X-ray diffraction 
photography. Recall the phase problem: in order to determine molecular structure 
from an X-ray diffraction photograph, one needs both the amplitude and absolute 
phase of the X-rays that are diffracted by the molecule. But an X-ray diffraction 
photograph only reveals the amplitudes and relative phases of the waves. Thus, 
each photograph permits several interpretations, each compatible with different 
absolute phases of the rays.
This brings us to the second factor that contributes to the confidence scientists 
could have in applications of constraints to reduce the size of the possibility space: 
the reliability of (interpretations of) the constraints themselves. Note that this is dif-
ferent from how confident scientists could be that they had correctly reduced the 
size of the possibility space through the consideration of each constraint: this second 
factor expresses the fact that confidence in the correct application of a constraint 
can vary even on the assumption that the constraint itself is reliable. I will argue that 
component-level constraints were more reliable than interpretations of X-ray diffrac-
tion photographs.
Interpretations of X-ray diffraction photographs of biological macromolecules 
were relatively unreliable because the photographs tended to be blurry.13 The 
size and complexity of biological macromolecules made them difficult to crystal-
lize, so they often lacked the regular structure characteristic of inorganic crystals, 
which was necessary for the production of a crisp X-ray diffraction photograph. 
At the time, then, it was prudent for scientists to approach each interpretation 
of an X-ray diffraction photograph of such macromolecules with a commensu-
rate degree of skepticism. Even if it appeared to be straightforward and obviously 
13 See, for instance, Astbury’s photos (Figs.  3, 4). In particular, contrast Astbury’s photo of DNA 
(Fig.  4), which Franklin discovered was of a mixture of the A and B forms, with Franklin’s photos 
(Fig. 5). It is important to note that while Astbury’s photos were widely available, Franklin’s were pub-
lished only in the same issue of Nature as Watson and Crick’s structure of DNA (Franklin and Gosling 
1953).
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correct, as was the case with Astbury’s interpretation of the 5.1-Å reflection in 
his photograph of alpha keratin, it was always possible that some other interpreta-
tion of the photograph could be found. Indeed, this is what eventually happened: 
Pauling and Crick independently discovered that two or more alpha helices could 
be coiled together like strands of a rope. This higher-order structure, dubbed 
the ‘coiled coil’, was responsible for the spot in the diffraction photograph that 
seemed to indicate a 5.1-Å height for one turn of the helix (Judson 1996).
In contrast, scientists could have relatively high confidence in component-level 
constraints. Whereas bond distances and angles were also determined by X-ray dif-
fraction studies, these studies were conducted on small molecules, such as glycine 
(Albrecht and Corey 1939) and alanine (Levy and Corey 1941). Due to the simplic-
ity of these molecules, X-ray diffraction photographs of them tended to be clearer 
than photos of complex macromolecules such as keratin. Moreover, their simplicity 
also left less room for alternative possible interpretations of their X-ray diffraction 
Fig. 4  Astbury’s X-ray diffrac-
tion photograph of DNA. Repro-
duced from Astbury (1947)
Fig. 5  Examples of Franklin’s diffraction photos of the A form (left) and the B form (right). Reproduced 
from Franklin and Gosling (1953)
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photos, like the coiled-coil explanation for the 5.1-Å spot in Astbury’s photographs. 
Finally, many bond distances and angles were further validated by subsequent stud-
ies. When Pauling was having difficulty finding a structure that conformed with 
Astbury’s X-ray diffraction photographs, he considered the possibility that he “was 
making some unjustified assumption about the structural properties of the mol-
ecules” (Pauling 1970, p. 1003), i.e. that one of the bond distances or angles in the 
polypeptide chain he was working with was wrong. So he and Corey performed 
X-ray diffraction studies on simple molecules over the next 10 years, the results of 
which only verified these bond distances and angles. Thus, by 1948, Pauling was 
convinced that “there was nothing surprising about the dimensions of these mol-
ecules,” and that his assumptions about the structural properties of the polypeptide 
chain from 1937 “were to be accepted as correct” (Pauling 1970, pp. 1003–1004). 
That is, each additional study on simple molecules lent further confirmation to com-
ponent-level constraints.
Average informativeness is a product of two factors, and there are differences 
between how component-level constraints and X-ray diffraction photographs 
perform on each. I have argued that although both component-level constraints 
and X-ray diffraction photographs enable the elimination of a considerable pro-
portion of the space of possible structures, scientists were warranted in having 
much more confidence in the former than in the latter. But I have also conceded 
that X-ray diffraction photographs enable the elimination of a greater proportion 
of the possibility space than do component-level constraints. Thus, one might 
object that since the two factors contributing to informativeness pull in opposite 
directions for each kind of constraint, it is not obvious that the informativeness 
of component-level constraints is higher, as I have here argued.
Why think that the better performance of component-level constraints on 
the second factor outweighs their poorer performance on the first? Mistakes in 
constraint application are costly, so as long as the numbers of structural candi-
dates eliminated by each kind of constraint are sufficiently alike, the constraints 
that are most highly confirmed should be considered first. Only if the disparity 
between the numbers of candidate structures eliminated is very high—say, with 
one constraint eliminating just a few structures, the other eliminating 90% of 
them—might it make sense to consider a less highly confirmed constraint before 
a more highly confirmed one. After all, applying a constraint that eliminates just 
a few structures would not get one much closer to the correct structure, even if 
the constraint were guaranteed to be reliable. On the other hand, if a constraint 
eliminates 90% of the possibility space, one might as well apply it. The payoff 
of being right is high, and if it turns out one is wrong, one would discover so 
shortly thereafter, and could easily backtrack and start again. Thus, we generally 
ought to choose constraints that eliminate structures with certainty, or as close 
to certainty as possible. And applications of component-level constraints do just 
this. On balance, then, the components-first heuristic was likely to be more effi-
cient than the photos-first one.
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Does the transformed problem reflect the real problem?
I have characterized the mid-twentieth-century problem of protein structure 
determination as beginning with a space of possible solutions, which may be nar-
rowed down through the successive consideration of component-level constraints 
and whole-molecule X-ray diffraction photographs. I argued that the constraint 
selected for consideration at each stage ought to be the most informative of those 
available: it ought to optimize the balance between how many possibilities are 
eliminated upon its application and how likely it is that this elimination has been 
conducted correctly. I showed that, other things being equal, component-level 
constraints were more informative than X-ray diffraction photographs, so the 
components-first heuristic is likely to be most cost-effective or efficient. Let us 
now turn to a question raised in “Introduction” section: to what extent does the 
problem as I have characterized it here reflect the original problems of protein 
and DNA structure determination? I will show that although my characterization 
introduces several idealizations, their effect on heuristic selection is either insig-
nificant, or else it enables the heuristic to be further refined.
First, I have assumed that constraints are individuated in a particular way, each 
eliminating a unique subset of the space of possible structures. In practice, how-
ever, there may be several alternative ways to individuate constraints. One may 
consider two or more of them together, for instance, by applying multiple com-
ponent-level constraints at once to more quickly reduce the size of the possibility 
space. Conversely, one may take a given constraint to say less about structure than 
I have been assuming here. For example, one might extract only coarse-grained 
information from an X-ray diffraction photograph, such as a helical structure for 
keratin, without inferring anything finer-grained, such as the distance between 
repeating subunits. Let us consider each such alternative individuation of con-
straints in turn.
The aggregation of multiple component-level constraints strengthens the 
case for the components-first heuristic being most efficient. Recall that a poten-
tial worry about my claim that component-level constraints are more informa-
tive than X-ray diffraction photographs was that the greater number of structures 
eliminated by considering X-ray diffraction photographs than by component-level 
constraints might be sufficient to outweigh the higher confidence scientists were 
warranted in having in these constraints. Upon aggregating multiple component-
level constraints, the structural candidates remaining for further consideration are 
those lying in the intersection of the spaces delineated by each of the constraints 
considered in isolation. Thus, the more such constraints we aggregate, the greater 
the proportion of the possibility space is eliminated by their consideration, and 
the more we can alleviate this worry. Moreover, the fact that constraints may be 
aggregated gives us a different way to make the point that, other things being 
equal, component-level constraints ought to be considered before X-ray diffrac-
tion photographs. Instead of considering the informativeness of individual such 
constraints, we may consider the informativeness of all of them taken together, 
and compare it to the informativeness of all X-ray diffraction photographs. Doing 
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this introduces another idealization, since in practice, scientists would not always 
work with one type of constraint independently of the other. But it also enables us 
to see more decisively why the informativeness of component-level constraints is 
higher than that of X-ray diffraction photographs.
What about the alternative individuation of constraints according to which we 
extract smaller bits of information from X-ray diffraction photographs, for instance, 
coarse-grained information about overall structure and finer-grained information 
about repeat distance? On such an individuation, it is possible that some of bits of 
information extracted from X-ray diffraction photographs could be more informative 
than some component-level constraints. For instance, the helical structure suggested 
by the X pattern in Astbury’s photographs was relatively highly confirmed: the low 
resolution of X-ray diffraction photography made it easier to extract such informa-
tion than finer-grained information about bond lengths and angles. Nevertheless, 
if the argument in “A (concrete) heuristic: average informativeness of constraints 
on molecular structure” section is correct, there would be few such instances: most 
component-level constraints would still be more informative than most (bits of infor-
mation extracted from) X-ray diffraction photographs.
Second, and related to the previous point, my argument assumes that there is one 
value of informativeness associated with component-level constraints and another with 
X-ray diffraction photographs, and I have argued that the former is higher than the lat-
ter. We may de-idealize the problem by considering the informativeness of particular 
component-level constraints and (bits of information extracted from) X-ray diffraction 
photographs.14 In so doing, we may produce a more fine-grained heuristic for molecu-
lar structure determination. However, and importantly, the coarse grain of the particu-
lar heuristic presented here is part of what makes it just that—a general guideline for 
how to approach the problem, from which one might deviate when there is good rea-
son to do so, rather than a strict set of rules that must be followed without exception.
Third, it is worth emphasizing the ceteris paribus clause implicit in a heuristic: 
other things being equal, one ought to consider the most informative constraint at 
each stage of problem solving. But of course other things tend not to be equal. One 
assumption I have made is that the scientists selecting between strategies are equally 
proficient in reasoning with component-level constraints and drawing inferences 
from X-ray diffraction photographs. In reality, however, scientists who are not suffi-
ciently familiar with reasoning from component-level constraints are likely to make 
mistakes when applying them; indeed, this is precisely what happened to Bragg, 
Kendrew, and Perutz. Thus, in some cases, it may well be more efficient to consider 
X-ray diffraction photographs before component-level constraints.15
14 We could further de-idealize by including other constraints on structure that I have not considered 
here. For instance, we might also include non-bonding interactions as additional constraints on structure, 
assigning them values of informativeness as outlined in “A (concrete) heuristic: average informativeness 
of constraints on molecular structure” section.
15 An additional consideration is how much demand on resources is associated with each kind of con-
straint. Since the process of producing and interpreting X-ray diffraction photographs was notoriously 
difficult and time-consuming, thus detracting from efficiency, taking this into consideration would 
strengthen the case for considering component-level constraints first.
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With this observation in hand, we may use the notion of average informativeness 
to answer two different questions. First, the one we have been considering: given the 
state of scientific knowledge and technology at the time, which heuristic should a rel-
atively neutral party—say, a beginning graduate student not yet embedded in a par-
ticular methodology—select? But also: which heuristic should a particular historical 
actor, with a specific set of skills and competencies, choose? To answer this second 
question, in place of the certainty that scientists in general were warranted in having in 
each constraint at the time, we may instead consider the certainty of a particular his-
torical actor, ignoring the normative question of whether this certainty was justified 
given the contemporary state of knowledge. Thus, the heuristic that considers the most 
informative constraints first can also be applied to individual methodological choices.
Denouement: explaining Pauling’s and Watson and Crick’s successes
I began this paper by citing a difference in approach to molecular structure determi-
nation between Pauling and Watson and Crick on the one hand and Bragg’s group 
and Franklin on the other: the former adopted a synthetic approach, building struc-
ture up from component-level constraints, whereas the latter opted for an analytic 
one, deriving structure from X-ray diffraction photographs. I then described two 
alternative heuristics, the components-first and photos-first heuristics, and argued 
that the former was more efficient than the latter, and thus its use would increase 
one’s probability of success. Although the primary aim of this paper is normative, 
I will now turn to a related, descriptive question: can the synthetic and analytic 
approaches adopted by the historical actors be understood as exemplifying the com-
ponents-first and photos-first heuristics respectively? And if so, can Pauling’s and 
Watson and Crick’s successes be, at least in part, attributed to their having adopted 
the heuristic likeliest to generate the correct structure in the shortest period of time? 
Although a comprehensive answer to this question would require a depth of histori-
cal analysis that is beyond the scope of this paper, I would like to at least gesture 
toward why I think it is yes.
Schindler (2008) has argued convincingly that, contrary to philosophical ortho-
doxy, Pauling, and later Watson and Crick, largely ignored direct empirical evi-
dence—that is, X-ray diffraction photographs—for the structures of protein and 
DNA respectively. They instead focused almost exclusively on building models 
based on known bond types, lengths, and angles, ensuring that these models sat-
isfied stereochemical considerations. This model-building approach can be under-
stood as a particular instantiation of the components-first heuristic, which provided 
a concrete way to prioritize component-level constraints in scientists’ reasoning.16 In 
16 In fact, I have argued elsewhere that model-building further contributed to the efficiency of the com-
ponents-first strategy. Because bond lengths and angles were physically instantiated in the pieces from 
which models were constructed, they were automatically prioritized; scientists using these models could 
not help but be constrained by them first. Moreover, model-building served as a cognitive aid, helping 
scientists to more quickly eliminate possible structures (Bolinska 2015).
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contrast, Bragg’s group and Franklin were skeptical of the model-building approach, 
instead prioritizing X-ray diffraction evidence in their search for structure. Schin-
dler shows that both Pauling and Watson and Crick generally took into considera-
tion component-level constraints first, building models on their basis, and compar-
ing them with X-ray diffraction photographs afterwards. In contrast, Bragg’s group 
and Franklin both began by analyzing X-ray diffraction photographs, checking their 
results against stereochemical constraints only thereafter. Here I restrict my attention 
to Schindler’s argument for the DNA case, although the argument for the protein 
case is similar.
Schindler synthesizes historians’ accounts of the discovery of DNA with historical 
actors’ autobiographical recollections of their research during this period.17 He con-
trasts Watson and Crick’s model-building strategy with Franklin’s attempt to derive 
the structure of DNA from her X-ray diffraction photographs (Schindler 2008, pp. 
630–33). Schindler cites Crick describing his and Watson’s approach as follows:
What Pauling did show us was that exact and careful model building could 
embody constraints that the final answer had in any case to satisfy. Sometimes 
this could lead to the correct structure, using only a minimum of the direct 
experimental [X-ray] evidence (Crick 1988, p. 60, cited in Schindler 2008, p. 
632; Schindler’s emphasis).
According to Crick, then, scientists were so confident in component-level constraints 
that the correct structure “had” to satisfy these constraints.
Crick also recognized that X-ray diffraction photos could be misleading:
There’s a perfectly sound reason – it isn’t just aesthetics or because we thought 
it was a nice game—why you should use the minimum of experimental evi-
dence. The fact is, you remember, that we knew that Bragg and Kendrew and 
Perutz had been misled by the experimental evidence. And therefore every 
bit of experimental evidence we had got at any one time we were prepared 
to throw away, because we said it may be misleading just the way that 5.1 
reflection in alpha keratin was misleading […] The point is that evidence can 
be unreliable, and therefore you should use as little of it as you can. (Crick, 
quoted in Judson (1996); original emphasis).
Since the structure had to satisfy component-level constraints, while X-ray diffrac-
tion photographs could be misleading, it made sense to begin by constructing a 
model that satisfied these constraints, consulting diffraction photos only thereafter.
Crick contrasts his and Watson’s approach with how Franklin and Maurice 
Wilkins, also at King’s College, worked18:
17 The two most prominent histories of these cases are Judson (1996) and Olby (1974). Other histo-
ries have more specific focuses: Hager (1995) on Pauling’s work, Hall (2014) on Astbury, and Maddox 
(2002) and Sayre (1975) on Franklin. For autobiographical accounts, see Watson (1968, 1980), Crick 
(1988), Wilkins (2003), and Pauling (1970).
18 Franklin and Wilkins had a notoriously strained relationship. Thus, although they were both at King’s, 
they did not collaborate closely.
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The King’s workers were reluctant to be converted to such an approach. 
Rosalind [Franklin], in particular, wanted to use her experimental data as fully 
as possible. I think she thought that to guess the structure by trying various 
models, using a minimum of experimental facts, was too flashy (Crick 1988, p. 
60, cited in Schindler 2008, pp. 632–33).
 Wilkins concurs:
Our main mistake was to pay too much attention to experimental evidence. 
Nelson won the battle of Copenhagen by putting his blind eye to the telescope 
so that he did not see the signal to stop fighting. In the same way, scientists 
sometimes should use the Nelson Principle and ignore experimental evidence 
(Wilkins 2003, p. 166, cited in Schindler 2008, p. 633; Schindler’s emphasis).
I encouraged Bruce Fraser, in our lab, to try out his ideas in a model. Rosalind 
dismissed our excitement by saying that model-building is what you do after 
you have found the structure (Wilkins 2003, p. 160, cited in Schindler 2008, p. 
632; Schindler’s emphasis).
 According to PhD student Raymond Gosling, Franklin’s collaborator, Franklin rea-
soned that the synthetic, model-building approach would be akin to “speculation;” 
in contrast, using their analytic approach, they could “let the spots on this photo-
graph tell [them] what the structure is.” (Gosling, quoted in Judson (1996, p. 127), 
my emphasis). Thus, whereas Watson and Crick generally applied component-level 
constraints first, Franklin took them into account only after giving full consideration 
to her X-ray diffraction photographs. That is, Watson and Crick, but not Franklin, 
adopted what I have argued was the most cost-effective heuristic for determining the 
structure of DNA.
If this is right, can Watson and Crick’s adoption of this heuristic explain their 
success? Developing an understanding of why a historical episode occurred the 
way it did is difficult. Numerous overlapping and complex factors contribute to the 
particular ways in which events unfold. These factors cannot always be identified, 
teased apart, or simplified, and counterfactual reasoning supporting the dominance 
of one causal explanation over another is necessarily defeasible. With this in mind, 
we may understand Watson and Crick’s having used the components-first heuristic, 
while Franklin adopted the photos-first one, to provide the following sort of expla-
nation for their success. Having adopted a heuristic that was more cost-effective than 
Franklin’s, Watson and Crick were more likely to solve the structure of DNA before 
her. The fact that they did indeed solve this structure first does not of course prove 
that their use of this heuristic was responsible for their success. Perhaps they made 
fewer mistakes in their reasoning than did Franklin, maybe social factors such as 
a strained relationship with Wilkins or being a woman in a male-dominated field 
significantly disadvantaged Franklin, or perhaps Watson and Crick just got lucky. 
But given that Watson and Crick’s having adopted this heuristic increased the like-
lihood of their success, we may consider their adoption of this heuristic, together 
with other proposals, a defeasible explanation for it. This does not undermine other 
possible explanations, which are all compatible with this one. For instance, even if 
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a misogynistic climate and a strained relationship with Wilkins imposed structural 
constraints that severely restricted what Franklin was able to accomplish,19 her hav-
ing adopted a less cost-effective heuristic might have further impeded her progress. 
Thus, adding this as an additional defeasible explanation enriches our understanding 
of this significant historical episode.
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